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NEGARA LEMAH DAN MILITAN KUAT: KEGANASAN AGAMA DI 
INDONESIA DENGAN RUJUKAN KHUSUS KEPADA JAKARTA, BALI 
MALUKU DAN POSO 
 
ABSTRAK 
Tesis ini cuba untuk menganalisis penglibatan kelompok militan Islam dalam 
serangan keganasan di Jakarta, Bali dan konflik agama berkait rapat dengan serangan 
pengganas di Maluku dan Poso serta dimensi politik dan keselamatan negara yang 
lemah bagi menjelaskan kebangkitan mereka. Dengan menggunakan kaedah 
perbandingan, tesis ini menghasilkan tiga penemuan penting. Pertama, Jemaah 
Islamiah (JI) didapati sebagai pelaku utama serangan pengganas di Jakarta, Bali, dan 
tempat-tempat lain di Indonesia. Kedua, corak yang sama penglibatan kumpulan-
kumpulan militan Islam tempatan, kebangsaan, dan penglibatan kelompok militan 
Islam antarabangsa telah dikenal pasti dalam konflik Maluku dan Poso. Walau 
bagaimanapun, beberapa perbezaan juga telah diperhatikan, termasuk penglibatan 
tertentu Laskar Mujahidin di konflik Maluku bukannya Poso dan sifat yang berbeza 
daripada serangan pengganas di Maluku dan konflik Poso. Ketiga, kewujudan 
hubungan antara institusi politik dan keselamatan yang lemah bertanggungjawab 
terhadap ketidakupayaan kerajaan untuk mencegah serangan keganasan dan konflik 
agama. Konflik berlapis, kontroversi yang menyelubungi golongan elit politik, 
amalan rasuah yang berleluasa dan nepotisme yang menjadi cabaran politik di 
peringkat pusat parti-parti politik, parlimen dan birokrasi, akhirnya melimpah ke 
peringkat tempatan. Satu-satunya perbezaan yang nyata ialah amalan rasuah yang 
dilakukan secara terbuka di Poso. Walau bagaimanapun, masalah yang sama 
berkaitan reformasi keselamatan juga ditemui di Jakarta yang telah membawa kepada 
politisasi dan konflik dalam kalangan tentera dan pegawai polis. Masalah ini 
membawa kepada keperpihakan terhadap mereka yang seagama, perkhidmatan 
xx 
 
perisikan yang tidak berkesan, pengkomersialan perkhidmatan keselamatan, 
penguatkuasaan undang-undang yang lemah, pengurusan penjara yang teruk, dan 
kawalan sempadan yang lemah. Yang terakhir ini telah membuka jalan bagi 
penghijrahan haram pengganas dan militan, penyeludupan senjata dan bahan letupan, 
dan penyebaran senjata haram. Apa yang menjadikan kes Poso sedikit berbeza ialah 
pengkomersialan perkhidmatan keselamatan adalah lebih jelas terlihat. 
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A WEAK STATE AND STRONG MILITANTS: 
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JAKARTA, BALI, MALUKU AND POSO 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to analyze the involvement of militant Islamist groups in terror 
attacks in Jakarta and Bali and religious conflicts intertwined with terror attacks in 
Maluku and Poso. It also looks at the political and security dimensions of a weak 
state to explain  their rise.  Using the comparative method, this thesis generates three 
important findings. First, the Islamist organization JI is found as the major 
perpetrator of  terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, and other places in Indonesia. Second, a 
similar pattern of local, national, and international Islamic militant groups’ 
involvement was identified in the Maluku and Poso conflicts. However, some 
differences have also been observed, including the particular involvement of Laskar 
Mujahidin in the Maluku conflict-instead of the  Poso one and the distinct nature of 
terror attacks in the Maluku and Poso conflicts. Third, the presence of a nexus 
linking weak political and security institutions is responsible for the government’s 
incapacity to prevent terror attacks and religious conflicts. Multi-layered conflicts 
and controversies surrounding political elites and rampant practices of corruption 
collusions and nepotisms, which serve as political challenges at central levels of  
political parties , parliament and bureaucracy, eventually spill over to local levels. 
The only stark difference is the relatively higher intensity of corruption openly 
practiced in Poso.  However, similar problems in security reform is also found in 
Jakarta, which lead to the politicization and conflicts among military and police 
officers. This degradation results in partisanships to their co-religionists, ineffective 
intelligence services, commercialization of security services, poor law enforcement, 
poor prison management, and poor border control. The latter opens the way for 
xxii 
 
illegal migration of terrorists and militias, smuggling of weapons and explosives, and 
diffusion of illegal arms. What makes the Poso case slightly different is its higher 
prevalence of security services commercialization. 
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Chapter 1 
                                                Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the militant face of political Islam has come under 
the global media spotlight. Its challenge to Western democracy and US hegemony 
replaces that of communism during the Cold War era. There are also fears that 
political Islam will challenge the tolerant and harmonious relations between not only 
Islam and the West but also between Muslims and adherents of other religions, 
especially Christians. Between 1980 and 1990, tolerance between Muslim and 
Christian communities declined significantly and the conflict between Muslims and 
the West intensified (Huntington, 2002:211). As a result of the current unique geo-
political developments, Islam has arguably become the adversary of many followers 
of other religions: for example, Jews in the Middle East; Christians in the Balkans, 
the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Sudan and sporadically in Indonesia and the 
Philippines; Hindus and Buddhists in South and Southeast Asia (Ahmed, 2003:25).  
The history of the conflict between Muslims and Christians and, more broadly, Islam 
and the West, can be traced from the former relationship between the two cultures 
and the power inherited from the alternate hegemonic interaction between followers 
of both these religions and civilizations. In the current context, this tension has 
resulted in a number of intertwining factors, including: a population boom in Muslim 
societies creating unemployment and thus jealousy;  militancy towards the West and  
migration to western countries; the reinvention of Muslim  confidence stimulated by 
Islamic resurgence; Muslim opposition towards the military; Western economic and 
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political intervention in Muslim countries and an awareness of differences between 
Muslim and Western identities (Huntington, 2002:211-212).  
Tensions between both Muslims and Christians and Muslims and the West appear to 
be grounded in Indonesia, a country with a majority Muslim population. Since the 
downfall of Suharto‟s New Order in 1998, Indonesia has suffered from religious 
conflicts and terrorism along the path to political democracy. During its transition to 
democracy, Indonesia experienced a mushrooming of radical and militant Islamist 
groups, which seek to promote shari’a law using violent means to achieve their goals 
and using Islamic doctrines and Islamic symbols to justify their actions. Their 
militancy takes the form of communal conflict, physical assault and terrorism. The 
rise of militant Islamist groups like Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam and others 
serves as examples of the rise of Islamic politics during  reformasi (reformasi).1  This 
is different from the development of cultural Islam during the New Order (1967-
1998). These small groups split from mainstream Islamic civil society organizations 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The other type of Islamic 
politics is the rise of Islamic political parties which contest in the general election 
(Azra, 2005:10). 
The origins of these militant Islamist groups can be classified into four categories. 
The first category consists of groups which emerged at the beginning of the 
reformasi with neither relation to past Islamist militant movements such as Darul 
Islam (DI), nor linkage to international Islamic groups. These groups include Laskar 
                                                          
1Reformasi or usually called democratic transition in Indonesia refers to the era after the downfall of 
Suharto‟s New Order in 1997.  It was marked by the social upheaval, following the financial and 
monetary crisis that swept the country and other southeast  asian countries in the late of eightiest. In 
Indonesia, reformasi becomes the social framing to push significant political, social and economic 
changes to achieve democratic life (www. alumnisejarah.ucoz.com, 1998). 
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Jihad (Jihad Troops), Front Pembela Islam (FPI/Islamic Defender Front), Komite 
Internasional Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI/International Committee for Muslim 
Solidarity) and some local Islamist groups. The second category includes groups 
with international networks, for example, Hizbut-tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which is a 
chapter of its main branch in Jordan.  The third category  includes groups connected 
to DI, but are not connected to any international network, for example, the Majelis 
Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI).  The fourth category includes groups with 
international networks and connections with the former DI, for example Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI). Other pivotal characteristics of these four groups are their rejection of 
the democratic political system and their support for the inclusion of Shari’ah law in 
the Indonesian constitution. These groups can be classified according to the way in 
which they achieve their mission, that is, those who justify the use of violence, such 
as Laskar Jihad, FPI, Laskar Mujahidin, and Jemaah Islamiyah, and those who do 
not, such as HTI and KISDI (Yunanto, 2003:6-8). 
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions  
The majority of the Indonesian population are moderate Muslims who have 
established organizations to promote peace, tolerance, interfaith dialogue, freedom of 
worship, and civic activism in the areas of education, economic development, and 
conflict resolution. Politically, Indonesian Muslims are not a single entity. They 
support Islamic political parties which struggle for the implementation of Shariah 
law and nationalistic political parties with no formal Islamic agenda in their political 
platform (Hardi, 2003:580). The pluralistic political reality of Indonesian Islam 
serves as the legacy of the syncretic terrain of indigenous beliefs eclectically made 
up of Hinduism, Buddhism, animism, and Islamic Sufism. Indonesian Islam is open 
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to the ideas of pluralism, moderation, and accommodation better than the version 
adhered to by Muslims in the Middle East. With this inclusive nature, the Western 
democratic society believes that Indonesian Muslims have the potential to accept the 
idea of democracy better than other Muslims in the world (Yunanto, 2003:1). 
Indonesian Islam is not monolithic in the sense that there is no single group which 
claims or exercises domination of Islamic teachings. Therefore, there is a great 
opportunity for Islam in Indonesia to become more progressive, more forward 
looking, and more responsive to this development (Azra, 2005:29). 
However, at the outset of reformasi, Indonesia was beset with the rise of vibrant 
militant Islamist groups which were involved in terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, and 
other places and in various religious conflicts intertwined with terror attacks in 
Maluku and Poso. Some of these groups abhor the democratic system and challenge 
the unitary state of Indonesia. Using Islamic pretexts and symbols, terror attacks 
have killed hundreds of innocent civilians, ruined hotels, churches, mosques, 
government buildings, and foreign embassy offices. Religious conflicts in Maluku 
and Poso have taken thousands of people‟s lives, wounded hundreds of thousands of 
others, and ruined both Muslim and Christian infrastructure. They have challenged 
the moderate Islamic groups, harmed religious tolerance and plurality, notably 
between Muslims and Christians, and damaged the good image of the moderate 
Indonesian Muslims. They threaten the nationalist political leadership which 
received support from the majority of moderate Indonesian Muslim communities, 
especially NU whose members are around 35-60 million and Muhammadiyah with  
around 30 million members (Azra, 2006:60; Hefner, 2002:757). 
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The demise of the New Order marked the democratic transition in Indonesia. The 
early years of reformasi brought about a few changes in the political and security 
sectors. Political reform promised Indonesia a democratic future characterized by 
freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and a fair election system. 
Reformasi has successfully amended the 1945 constitution which strengthens the 
parliament‟s legislative power. It has also implemented a multi-party system which 
offers the people more opportunities to participate in politics. This is a different 
experience from that of the New Order era which limited people‟s political 
participation to certain groups (Maruto and Anwari, 2002: 127–132).  
The mushrooming of political parties, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and 
freedom to establish organizations have stimulated people to be aware of their 
political rights which had, for so many years, been limited and subjected to 
humiliation. In some instances, these cumulative demands have turned into political 
upheavals, demonstrations, and protest movements (Romli, 2003:132–33).  In the 
security sector, reformasi has transformed the socio-political role of TNI (The 
Indonesian Army) and the intelligence agencies, generated omnibus multi-sectoral 
defence legislations, broadened the authority of the POLRI (The Indonesian Police), 
and improved defence budget and defence technology policies (Laksmana, 2010:3).  
However, the progress made by reformasi only brings about a superficial 
transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic government system. It has not 
yet resulted in a more effective political system which should have produced 
responsive public policies that meet the people‟s expectations. Law enforcement is 
stagnant, the bureaucratic reform is slow, and the coordination between the central 
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and the local governments does not work efficiently (Maruto and Anwari, 2002: 
127–132).    
During this turmoil, political and security institutions from the central to local levels 
have been found too weak to assume their responsibility in protecting the people. 
They have failed to prevent the conflict and terror attacks. Political institutions such 
as the civil society, political parties, parliament, and bureaucracy at both national and 
local levels suffered from multi-layered problems. Therefore, they have been unable 
to exercise control over the transformation of security institutions such as TNI, 
POLRI, and intelligence services from their authoritarian legacies to the modern ones 
which should be subject to democratic control. 
To solve religious conflicts and combat terrorism, Indonesia has to strengthen its 
political and security institutions. Failing to do so will stimulate people‟s distrust 
toward the democratic system and invite anti-democratic interests to bring Indonesia 
back to its authoritarian yet stable and orderly system. Having this problem in mind, 
this thesis seeks to answer two research questions:   
1. How were the militant Islamist groups involved in the conflicts and terror 
attacks during Indonesia‟s transition into a more democratic country?  
2. What political and security challenges weakened Indonesia in preventing 
terrorism and religious conflicts?   
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
1.3.1 Weak State and Religious Militancy 
This thesis uses the “weak state” theory to explain the incapability of a state to 
protect people during terror attacks and religious conflicts. A weak state is 
characterized by indicators of economic, social, political, and security problems, of 
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which politics and security serve as the dominant factors (Patrick, 2006:5–6). Being 
consistent with the focus of this research, this thesis analyzes Indonesia as a weak 
state from political and security dimensions.  
From the political dimension, a weak state faces three main challenges. First, it is 
either unable to create social and political consensus amongst political powers or 
unable to solve communal and political conflicts amongst factions in the state. Since 
the government is unable to control the conflicting groups, the conflicts will then 
cripple the state and sometimes even destroy the central government (Buzan, 
1983:66–67; Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde, 1998:146; Laitin and Brubaker, 
1998:437; Rotberg, 2003:4). Such conflicts are rooted in the ethnicity, religions, and 
languages which the militants capitalize on to legitimize the conflicts, to rally 
support, and to strengthen their own class, identity, and language. Religion provides 
them with militant caders and rituals important for the rise of militancy (Rotberg, 
2003:4; Panggabean, 2004:53; Perwita, 2005:2; Appebly, 2000:109).  
Second, due to the crippling conflicts, the state finally loses its political will, 
capacity, legitimacy, and capability to mobilize its own economic and political 
resources, to penetrate its people, to make social regulations, to mobilize resources, 
to enforce law, public order, and sanctions, and to control its citizens (Newman, 
2007:3; Buzan, 1983: 66–67; Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 146; Migdal, 
1988:xiii–xiv; Rotberg, 2003:4). Third, a weak state is typically beset with rampant 
corruption (Rotberg, 2003:4)2. In other words, weak states are those whose 
                                                          
 
2 In addition to the presence of domestic ethnic and religious conflict, rampant practices of corruption, 
and poor law enforcement, Rotberg also lists problems of poor state management, the presence of 
external attacks, despotism, low per-capita income, poor infrastructure, and the undermining of the 
role of civil society as the important indicators of a weak state (Rotberg, 2003:4). 
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institutions are ineffective and not autonomous in assuming their responsibility 
(Tadjoeddin, 2002:11). 
From the security dimension, a weak state is characterized by two main challenges. 
First, the formulation of its national security policies is primarily devoted to dealing 
with domestic conflicting groups, organizations, or individuals that challenge the 
government‟s legitimacy. The design of the national security policy is to meet the 
government‟s interest instead of the state‟s interest. This is different from that of the 
strong state which is primarily focused on protecting their people from external 
threats. Such design meets both the government‟s and state‟s interests (Buzan, 
1983:66–67; Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998:146). Second, a weak state also 
faces problems with enforcing border control, thus making it a convenient source, 
transit, and destination country for illegal arms business. Terrorists and militias then 
use the state as their safe haven to set training programs, conduct indoctrination, and 
access weapons, equipment, and finance (Patrick, 2006:8–9-10; Newman, 2007:3). 
1.3.2 A Weak State and Democratization in Indonesia  
Democratization is like two sides of coins. On one face, it promises the hope for 
changes and progress  toward a better life that  stimulate people‟s eagerness for 
democratization.  On the other face, it‟s initial stage is usually marked with the 
weakening state institutions which bring about instability, revolution, widespread 
violent conflicts, and give rise to conservative leaders who propagate anti-democratic 
nationalist movements. Liberating authoritarianism risks the unstable equilibrium 
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and the vulnerable compromise amongst conflicting parties (Huntington, 1991:121-
124; Snyder, 2003:4; O‟Donnel  &  Schmitter, 1986:3-11). Nationalist conflict is the 
side product of the elite‟s effort to persuade people to join their nationalist agenda, 
which contains elements of conflict. The elite manipulates nationalism to legitimize 
the partial democracy, where they can use the voice of the people without being 
responsible to them (Snyder, 2003:18, 23). Such conflicts and other revolutionary 
changes may go beyond the political dynamics, along with other manifestations of 
mass mobilization like protests, strikes, and demonstrations, coinciding with the 
declining hope for democratization (O‟Donnel & Schmitter, 1986:3-11).  
Since its democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia has suffered from a number of 
terror attacks and religious conflicts in a number of locations. Indonesia has become 
one of the main destinations of Al-Qaeda‟s operations, has suffered from spreading 
sectarian conflicts such as those taking place in Ambon and Poso and threats of self- 
determination and regional autonomy such as those taking place in Aceh and 
Papua. Democratization in Indonesia requires a strong state which is able to deliver 
its basic function and to protect its people. Post-reformasi Indonesia is weak in 
providing protection to its citizens (Rabasa, 2001:9; Azra, 2005:28). 
Indonesia is ranked in the fourth quintile of the weakest countries in terms of security 
(Patrick, 2006:6). It experiences multi layered political conflicts which make it 
incapable to  make sound security policy and take necessary security measures 
needed to prevent religious conflicts and terrorism. Counter-terrorism in Indonesia 
and other southeast asian countries should emphasize the effective role of the police 
and justice systems in enforcing law and order and ensuring political accountability, 
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in addition to dealing with terrorist grievances and reducing the factors that motivate 
them (Hamilton-Hart, 2008:10-11). 
1. 4 Defining Islamic militancy, religious violence, religious conflict and 
terrorism 
The term Islamic militancy can be understood from two perspectives: the substance 
and the approach. From the perspective of the substance, Islamic militancy is defined 
in similar terms with Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic radicalism (Fadl, 2005:18). 
With regard to the former, it refers to the belief that Islam serves as the fundamental 
value in politics, economy and social relations. The manifestation of militancy takes 
the form of the struggle to insert Islamic teaching, or Shari’ah law in the state. The 
militants view this as the fundamental and non-negotiable ideology, similar to 
capitalism or socialism, by which they view the state as a means to promote their 
programs (Jansen, 1979:188; Pipes, 2002:8). Jansen classifies Islamic militancy into 
four groups; the rude or the evil, such as Imam Khomeini‟s militancy in Iran; the 
flexible or the open, such as Indonesian Muhammad Natsir‟s militancy; the flexible 
but impatient, such as Sadeq Al Mahdi‟s militancy in Sudan; and the inspiring but 
threatening, such as the Muslim Brotherhood‟s militancy in Egypt (Jansen, 
1979:188). 
Similar to the meaning of “radicalization”, the term “militancy” refers to the strong 
belief and desire to make such a belief happen in the social and the political change 
(Cobuild, 2000:977), the struggle to oppose the state on behalf of Islam (Ibrahim, 
2001) and the rejection of Western values which they perceive as incompatible with 
Islam (Pipes, 2002:8). In doing so, militants adopt a literal interpretation of the 
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Kuranic verses as the basis for misusing and manipulating Islamic teaching to 
legitimize their militant and radical action (Azra, 2004:122). 
To achieve the objective, many scholars agree that militancy refers to the use of 
extremism and unacceptable ways (Cobuild, 2000:977), collective violence (Ibrahim 
, 2001) excessive force (Fadl, 2005:18), violence (Deep, 1992:.55), aggression and  
violence (Pipes, 2002:8), violence and terrorism (Azra, 2004:102). From this 
perspective, Islamic militancy has a similar meaning with extremism and terrorism in 
that they share the use of violence, coercion or an unlawful way to promote the 
mission. The involvement of Muslims in religious conflicts and terrorism serves as 
the manifestation of militancy, as both employ the use of violence in different forms. 
In its violent nature, conflict becomes a typical competition to win over value, power 
or status by injuring, attacking their rivals by using violence or armed force as the 
means to achieve the incompatible goals of the two parties. Using this definition, 
conflict prevention means preventing the use of violence and armed force, not 
preventing the competition (Panggabean, 2004:56-57). In theory, the distinction 
between communal, ethnic, religious, civil war and internal conflicts is not clear. In 
Indonesia, these types of conflicts are defined in broad terms as ethnic, racial and 
religious conflicts (Sukma, 2005: 41). Religious conflict is analyzed within the broad 
scope of ethnic conflict, as Horowitz argues, all ethnic conflicts are rooted in “the 
ascribed group‟s identity such as race, language, religion, tribes, nationality and 
caste” (Trijono, 2004:4).  
Other scholars classify religious violence, such as the conflict in Poso and Ambon, as 
communal violence; that is, the violence which erupts between two social groups 
who attack each other. Such attacks are motivated by one or more of the following 
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reasons; religion, social class, political affiliation and even simple village-level 
differences (Tadjoeddin, 2002:24). Within the context of militancy, conflict is 
defined from the perspective of violence, while religious conflict is a typical form of 
violence motivated by religious interpretation aimed at achieving the incompatible 
goals of the two conflicting parties.  
In its simple, albeit problematic conception, terrorism may be defined as (1) the 
manifestation of militancy as it employs the use of typical forms of violence to 
randomly spread fear targeted at civilians with political motives (Sihbudi, 2006: 42, 
Anggoro, 2003:231), (2) a typical intimidation or coercion against the government or 
people, using unlawful force or violence targeting humans or property with the aim 
of furthering political and social objectives (Salam, 2004: 30), or (3) targeting 
combatants with psychological motives beyond the direct victims (Cooper, 
2004:30). Its tactic consists of bombing vital places, hijacking, killing, kidnapping 
and hostage taking (Manulang, 2005:101). 
Militant Islamists manipulate the Islamic doctrine to legitimize their violent conduct 
in conflict and terrorism. According to Schoenfeld, in conflict situations, such 
manipulation is understandable, given the fact that any religion has two „faces‟, 
similar to the two sides of a coin: a peaceful „face‟ and a violent „face‟. In its 
peaceful „face‟, religion creates social harmony and order, social integration, 
meaning and morality. In its violent „face‟, religion stimulates war and revolution by 
monopolizing truth which then strengthens a collective consciousness. Extremism 
and violence are by-products of ethnocentrism and submissions to power 
(Schoenfeld, 1993:37-38). 
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All religions have a typical interpretation of doctrines to legitimize violence or force. 
Islamic Jihad has often been interpreted as the teaching which legitimizes war or 
physical attack, albeit in its multiple interpretative meanings. Christian leaders have 
promoted hard line actions and violence as the manifestation of liberation theology to 
uplift their underdeveloped followers. Hindus promote the Hindutva, the 
interpretation of Hindu‟s teaching within the framework of nationalistic spirit as the 
way to reject secularization and pluralistic state (Appebly, 2000:112-114). Regarding 
religious terrorism, Jurgensmeyer provides an analogy with religious rituals or 
practices aimed at extending the impact to the audience, not politically motivated 
violence. Religious terrorism is motivated by an imaginative “cosmic” stage, a 
typical imaginative motivation which is presently beyond reality (Cooper, 2004:57).  
This research concerns Islamic militancy in terms of the use of unlawful or 
unacceptable ways, which take the form of violence, aggression and extremism to 
promote their missions. Militant Islamists materialize their spirit through their 
involvement in religious conflict and terrorism where Militant Islamists and their 
adversaries use violence to promote their missions. By the same token, this research 
does not discuss or analyze the substantive perspective of Islamic militancy which 
has similar meanings with fundamentalism, radicalism and Islamism, such as the 
reason behind their struggle to implement shari’a law and the interpretation of 
Islamic teaching that they offer as the alternative to the secular and Western systems. 
Instead, the research discusses how militants expose their violent, aggressive and 
extremist actions to promote their missions. The religious conflict discussed in the 
literature shares the same characteristics with religious militancy in that both use 
violent adversaries in the state territory. Brown categorizes this conflict into internal 
conflicts; that is, a conflict which takes the form of power wrestling, opposition from 
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the evil group against state sovereignty, ideological conflict, ethnic conflict and 
separatism (Brown, 2005).         
1.5 The Objective of the Study 
At a theoretical level, this research, firstly, aims to find out the nature and the 
emergence of the Islamist militant groups who were involved in terror attacks in 
Jakarta and Bali and those who were involved the religious conflicts in Maluku and 
Poso. It also seeks to understand linkages amongst them and with local militant 
groups and other similar groups in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines. Secondly, it aims to understand the intensity of their involvement with 
terrorism in the religious conflict in the four selected regions.  Thirdly, it aims to find 
out the political and security challenges at the national and local  levels which 
contributed to their rise. This research hypothesizes that such challenges have 
provided favorable conditions for their militancy.  
The study will hopefully fill the gaps in the existing literature on the causal factors of 
the rise of militant Islamist groups, which have been dominated by other 
perspectives, including relative deprivation, ideological and historical perspectives. 
By taking a political and security dimension, it is expected that this thesis will enrich 
the theoretical debate concerning the politics of identity and political Islam in its 
relationship with democratization and the politics of security. In the post-Cold War 
era, the academic debate on these issues is timely at the national, regional and 
international levels. Fourthly, at a practical level, this research will provide policy 
inputs in conflict prevention, combating terrorism and security sector reform which 
have become pivotal components in the success of the on-going democratic transition 
in Indonesia. 
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1.6 The Significance of the Study  
In the context of Indonesia, neighboring regional countries and the international 
community, these issues will be highly relevant in the years to come. The President 
of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has stated that terrorism, 
along with corruption and drugs, have become the major enemies of the Indonesian 
people. Solving these problems has become a priority for the Indonesian government 
and its citizens (www.presidensby.info, 2005). The Indonesian National Police 
(POLRI: Polisi Republik Indonesia) has been successful in arresting and convicting 
the perpetrators of the Bali Bombings, as well as killing Dr. Azahari, the most 
wanted intellectual actor who was allegedly the mastermind behind a number of 
terror attacks in Indonesia.  The POLRI  continues to hunt others who have evaded 
arrest (www.presidensby.info, 2006). In recent years, terror threats have haunted 
people across the world, including in Thailand and Mumbai, India, experiences from 
which Indonesia can learn (www.presidensby.info, 2008). 
In a speech to launch the Operation Candlelight to ensure the security of Christmas 
celebrations in 2008, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri: Kepala 
Polisi Republik Indonesia) warned that terror bombings remained a serious threat 
following street demonstrations and other social vulnerabilities. POLRI has put terror 
threats as the priority target in the security operation (Silalahi, 2008). In the coming 
years, the threat of religious terrorists is predicted to increase, while the threat posed 
by nationalist terrorists is projected to decrease. Religious terrorists have gained 
confidence from their success in attracting public attention, destroying government 
and business activities; taking people‟s lives; collecting and storing weapons, 
explosive materials and money; conducting secret communication and attracting 
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international support which facilitates their action (Chaerudin, 2003:15-21). Despite 
the successful arrest and imprisonment of Jemaah Islamiyah members by the 
Indonesian police, the Australian Government and other governments still consider 
this terrorist group as a serious threat (Setiawan, 2008).  
For Southeast Asian countries, terrorism has also become one of the most important 
items on the security agenda and one of the main topics discussed at the Regional 
Chief Police Conference    ( www.asean.org, 2008) held in Brunei Darusssalam on 
25-29 May 2008, with delegates from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and  Vietnam. This 
regional meeting addressed the importance of the exchange of accurate information 
concerning terrorists and terrorist organizations, the need to strengthen commitment 
in tracing, freezing and confiscating terrorist assets, dealing with the terror victims, 
and coherent coordination with the regional Interpol (aseansec.org, 2008). The 
Indonesian Government cooperates with other countries to fight against terrorism 
and actively participates in forums such as the ASEAN Convention on Counter 
Terrorism (ACCT), a forum which serves as the legal umbrella used to fight against 
terrorism, followed by the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action (ACPOA), 
ASEAN Minister Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and Senior Official 
Meeting On Transnational Crime (SOMTC), held once a year, as the follow-up to 
AMMTC.  
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1.7 Methodology 
1.7.1 Case selection 
This research uses the comparative method. As Harold Lasswell argues, it is an 
important analytical tool to meet the sound academic standard by drawing inferences 
or generalizations from the logical relationship across sets of concepts represented by 
the observed variables. Such inferences and generalizations are built up from 
similarities and differences of the observed cases and variables and how they are 
explained. In other words, the comparative method is a procedure used to draw 
inferences or generalizations by looking at similar results and similar causes or 
different results and different causes in some social units or across the time within a 
social unit (Lasswell, 1968:3-18). 
The thesis will use the comparative method to understand the similarity and 
differences of the nature and linkages of the militant Islamist groups which were 
embroiled in religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso and terror attacks in Jakarta, 
Bali, Maluku, and Poso. This method will also be used to understand the likely 
similarities and differences of the political and security challenges which contributed 
to the terror attacks and conflicts in the four selected case-study locations. This thesis 
hypothesizes these four areas share similarities in being targets of Islamic militancy. 
Maluku and Poso were selected due to the presence of religiously motivated 
conflicts, intertwined with terror attacks such as bombings. This research seeks to 
understand the similarity and differences of vulnerable security measures and the 
presence of political problems in these two regions. Jakarta and Bali were also 
selected as case-study locations as these two cities have suffered from repeated terror 
bombings and terror threats. This research seeks to understand the vulnerable 
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security policies and political contention in the formulation, implementation and 
oversight of the Indonesian Government‟s counter-terrorism policies.  
On the rise of militant Islamist groups as a dependent variable, this thesis first 
examines the brief profiles of the groups, their linkages, and their involvement in 
conflicts and terrorism. In terms of political challenges, this thesis looks at the 
presence of multi-layered conflicts and controversies among political powers 
consisting of political elites at both national and local levels. Such conflicts and 
controversies have weakened political will and law enforcement. In addition, the 
analysis of political challenges also touches on the problem of corruption. In terms of 
security challenges, the thesis examines three problems related to security 
institutions: (1) poor policy making processes which lead to the incapacity of the 
state to enforce public order, (2) conflicts among the institutions which may develop 
partisanship towards their respective co-religionists, and (3) lax border controls 
which lead to the smuggling and diffusion of small arms and light weaponry used by 
terrorists and militias to support their attacks. 
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1.7.2 Method of Data Collection  
This thesis employs qualitative methods comprising the following activities. Firstly, 
a review of the existing literature was undertaken to synthesize previous research 
which discusses the topics raised in this research. Secondly, an analysis of media 
sources was conducted to discuss and analyze the nature of the conflict and terrorism 
and government policies in dealing with the issue. Thirdly, Indonesian government 
documents which contain the nature of the conflict and terrorism, responsive policies 
such as laws, standard operation procedures, and problems of their implementation 
were analyzed. Finally, interviews were conducted with policy makers, leaders of the 
militant Islamists groups who were involved in terrorism and The Poso and Maluku 
conflicts, researchers and academician who had particular attention or did researcher 
on this subjects. 
During the research, 22 informants were interviewed. To understand the 
implementation and challenges of the government policy on countering terrorism and 
conflict prevention, I interviewed Ansyaad Mbai, the Head of  National Counter-
terrorism Agency ( BNPT: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme) and Basri 
Tuahuns, a retired army colonel who was a former field army commander during 
Maluku conflict. To get a more balanced opinion, I also interviewed  Dr. Wawan 
Purwanto, a leading observer and analyst of security, communal conflicts, and 
terrorism; Syamsul Alam Agus, a human right activist who did humanitarian work 
during the Poso Conflict; Anis, S.H., a Muslim lawyer who provided  legal defence 
to terrorist suspects; K.H. Hasyim Muzadi, the vocal NU leader with moderate views 
in combating terrorism and resolving religious conflicts; and Brig. Gen. (retired) 
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Rustam Kastor, an former army strongman in Maluku who provided strong support 
to Muslim militia, especially Laskar Jihad. 
To get a clearer insight into terrorist organizations, their involvement in terror attacks 
and conflicts, and their response to government policy and security measure to 
combat terrorism and to solve religious conflicts, I interviewed five figures: Abu 
Bakar Baashir, the leading Amir of JI, the former Amir of MMI, and now also the 
Amir of Jemaah Ansharuttauhid (JAT); Abdul Wahab Lumaela and Husein Toisuta, 
two militant Islamist leaders who played pivotal roles in the Maluku conflict; Abu 
Jibril, the leader of JI and Laskar Mujahidin; and Zarkasyih or Nuaim or Mbah, one 
of the JI leaders now in jail. To get more detailed information on the intensity of the 
Maluku and Poso conflicts, I interviewed Ateng, a former Muslim militia leader in 
Poso; Sahrul, a former combatant of the Tanah Runtuh militia group in Kanyamana, 
Poso; a former combatant leader of a Muslim militia in Ambon who prefers to 
remain unanonymous; and Nashir Abbas, a former leader of Mantiqi III of JI who 
was actively involved in the Poso conflict.  
To get a more balanced opinion, I also interviewed Jimmy, a former field leader of a 
Christian militia in Poso and Father Damanik, a Christian priest and religious leader 
in Poso. More detailed information on the involvement of JI linkages in terror attacks 
were collected from interviews with a former DI activist and a former Afghan 
fighter. Both prefer to remain unanonymous.  
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1.8 Organization of the thesis  
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the background, problem statement and the research question,   
theoretical frameworks and definitions of the major concepts used in the research 
which form the body of the research. It posits the political and security perspectives 
as the theoretical framework used in the research. It also presents the methodology of 
collecting and analyzing the data and selecting the cases of observation.  The data 
collection employs qualitative methods such as existing research, government 
documents, media, and interviews.  
Chapter 2:  Perspectives in explaining Islamic militancy in Indonesia and their 
critiques: A literature review 
This chapter discusses and analyzes the alternative answers to the research question 
which this thesis theorizes into relative deprivation, ideology, history, politics and 
security perspectives. Following an analysis and critique, this thesis chooses the 
political and security perspectives as a framework to discuss and analyze the 
collected data. 
Chapter 3: The Strong Militants: The Rise of Militant Islamist Groups in 
Terrorism and Religious Conflicts in Indonesia 
This chapter discusses and analyzes the rise of vibrant local, national, regional and 
international militant Islamist groups in terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, and other 
locations, and the Maluku and Poso conflicts. Before analyzing their involvement in 
terror attacks and in the Maluku and Poso conflicts, this chapter first highlights brief 
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profiles of the militant groups such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), Laskar Mujahidin (LM), 
Laskar Jundullah (LJU), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It also briefly explores their 
history, fragmentation, and linkages with other militant Islamist groups in their 
respective regions.  
Chapter 4:  The Weak State:  Political Challenges in Explaining Terrorism and 
the Maluku and Poso Conflicts  
This chapter analyzes the political dimension of a weak state in terms of the presence 
of political conflicts, controversy, and practices of corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism (KKN). It also analyzes the nexus between multi-layered political conflicts, 
corruption practices at the central government level during the early years of 
reformasi, and corrupt practices taking place in Maluku and Poso before and during 
the conflicts. Taken together, they contributed to the weakening of the government 
apparatus in dealing with conflicts and terrorism.  
Chapter 5: The Weak Security Institutions: Politicization,  Corruption,Lax  
Border Controls  and Poor Law Enforcement 
While chapter 4 analyzes the political dimension of a weak state and explains the 
incapacity of the government to tackle conflicts and terrorism, chapter 5 looks at the 
security dimension as an important indicator of a weak state.  It categorizes such 
weaknesses into problems of the security institution and problems of security 
performance. Problems of security institutions include the politicization of security 
institutions leading to internal conflicts and partisanship towards their co-religionists.  
Problems of security performance take the form of commercialization of security 
services and border control management, which eventually leads to illegal migration 
of militias, smuggling of arms and explosive material, and diffusion of illegal arms. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter draws a line from chapter one to five and tests the feasibility and 
deviation of the political and security perspective, which, it is hypothesized, is a 
sufficient explanation on the rise of militant Islamists groups in Indonesia. It 
summarizes how theories discussed in chapter one are proven in the other four 
chapters. In addition, this chapter provides the distinctive theoretical and practical 
contribution to the study of political Islam, democratization and the politics of 
security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
